Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Google NYC
3:00 - 4:00 p.m., Tuesday, October 4, 2011
4403 Siebel Center
(How) Can We Secure Interdomain Routing?
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) establishes routes between the administrative domains that make up the Internet, and is the glue which holds today's Internet together. Unfortunately, BGP is amazingly vulnerable to configuration errors and to attacks, as evidenced by recent major Internet outages. To remedy this, security-enhanced versions of BGP have been proposed. Yet, despite over a decade of work, none of these proposals have been deployed. For a long time, it seemed that the main obstacle was technical infeasibility. However, it has since become clear that the main challenges lie elsewhere: (1) lingering disagreements about which of the major proposals to adopt; (2) lack of economic incentives for adoption. To address these challenges, we present ways to quantify the security guarantees of the proposed extensions of BGP, and also market mechanisms that can drive transition to BGP security.
Joint work with Sharon Goldberg, Pete Hummon and Jennifer Rexford (2010) and with Phillipa Gill and Sharon Goldberg (2011).
Michael Schapira is a senior lecturer (assistant professor) at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a visiting scientist at Google NYC. His research draws ideas from theory (e.g., optimization theory, game theory, distributed computing theory) to design and analyze practical protocols for Internet environments (e.g., routing, congestion control, traffic engineering). He holds a Ph.D. in Computer Science (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2008) and has been a postdoctoral researcher at UC Berkeley, Yale University and Princeton University. He is the recipient of the Allon Fellowship for Outstanding Young Researchers (2011).